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Résumé / Abstract
Ce papier présente une étude expérimentale sur l'influence des asymétries d'information et de la
diffusion de l'information entre firmes sur l'issue des négociations. Nous proposons un prolongement ainsi
qu'un test du modèle de Kuhn et Gu (1999) concernant l'apprentissage dans des négociations séquentielles.
Nous utilisons pour cela deux jeux d'ultimatum avec incertitude du coté du proposant. Les résultats
expérimentaux montrent que l'hypothèse de Dunlop d'un biais inflationniste systématique des
revendications salariales n'est jamais vérifiée et que conformément aux prédictions de Kuhn et Gu, la
probabilité d'apparition d'une grève diminue en présence de diffusion de l'information. En effet, une
révision des demandes en fonction du résultat des négociations passées est observée dans les données
expérimentales. Pourtant, observer seulement le résultat des négociations passées et non le processus de
négociation ne suffit à garantir une augmentation Pareto optimale des gains des joueurs. Les
préoccupations d'équité entravent les effets bénéfiques de la diffusion de l'information entre firmes.
This paper reports on an experimental study of the influence of asymmetric information and
information spillovers on bargaining outcomes. It develops and tests Kuhn and Gu (1999)’s model of
learning in sequential wage negotiations, by means of two Ultimatum Bargaining Games with uncertainty
on the proposer’s side. Evidence shows that Dunlop’s assertion of inflationary wage claims does not hold
systematically and strike incidence is lowered by information spillovers, since claims are revised
according to the previous bargaining outcomes. However, in the presence of fairness concerns, the ability
to observe outcomes but not the bargaining process does not entail a reduction in information asymmetry
sufficient to guarantee Pareto improving bargaining outcomes.
.
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I. Introduction
The economic theory of strikes has long been dominated by the so-called “Hicks’s paradox” in
which a strike can never be Pareto-optimal ex ante (Hicks, 1963; Kennan, 1986). Sequential
bargaining models under asymmetric information provide theoretical foundations to escape this
paradox (Hayes, 1984; Card, 1990; Cramton and Tracy, 1992; Kuhn and Gu, 1999). When the
firm is informed on its profitability, but not the union, Pareto-optimal ex ante strikes may occur
between rational agents. When embarking on a strike, the union acquires information on the firm’s
profitability and may revise his claims. Consequently, the diffusion of information should reduce the
strike incidence.
While the bulk of literature restricts the scope of bargaining and learning to a single firm context,
except when analyzing wage spillovers among unionized markets, this paper forwards the
collection by unions of information on bargaining outcomes in other firms from the same industry.
Two conflicting views can then be opposed. Dunlop (1957) assumes that the observation of
previously negotiated wage settlements entails an inflationary wage drift, inasmuch as these latter
become a target to be reached by the following unions. In contrast, Kuhn and Gu (1999)
sequential bargaining model under asymmetric information predicts an adjustment of union’s
beliefs and claims whenever unions are given to observe previous negotiations in correlated firms.
This should therefore enable a reduction in the risk of conflict. The opposition between these
approaches comes from Dunlop’s focus on the role of emotions (envy or equity) in the definition
of union claims. In contrast, from the study of a panel of Canadian contract negotiations, Kuhn
and Gu conclude that unions’ behavior is mainly motivated by the reduction of informational
asymmetry. Nevertheless, they cannot directly invalidate Dunlop’s assertion since they cannot
measure emotional concerns.
This paper aims at estimating the role of information spillovers on both strike incidence and wage
settlements by testing, through a laboratory experiment, a game directly inspired by Kuhn and Gu.
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Econometric studies are constrained by the use of proxies of informational asymmetry. The
formation of union’s prior beliefs regarding the firm’s profitability remain unobservable to the
econometrician. Consequently, the models’ outcomes are more frequently estimated than their
very mechanisms. As remarked by Pencavel (1991), one is not always sure that the results of
estimations really measure the implications of asymmetric information instead of the efficiency of
proxies. Laboratory experiments, in allowing to control directly private and asymmetric
information, may help in measuring its effects on behavior and interactions.
Like in Kuhn and Gu, we propose herein a model in which two union-firm pairs bargain in
sequence over the share of a pie. We design each union-firm pair negotiation as a non cooperative
Ultimatum Bargaining Game (UBG) with asymmetric information, since UBG enables to
distinguish between rationality and emotions in bargaining situations. An UBG is a two-person
bargaining game in which a proposer, here the union, proposes the division of a sum to a
responder who either accepts or rejects this proposal; in case of acceptation, each receives the
amount agreed upon, otherwise both players get nothing. Each union is informed about the
distribution of probability regarding the state of the firm and on the degree of correlation between
the 2 firms. In contrast, each firm is perfectly informed on her state. It should be noted that there is
only little research on UBG which puts uncertainty on the proposer’s side (Kagel, Kim and
Moser, 1996; Forsythe, Kennan and Sopher, 1991a).
In order to test the link between information and bargaining outcomes, which cannot be estimated
in Kuhn and Gu’s econometric tests, we relax their constraint of a similarity between the
information on the distribution of probability and the unions’ beliefs about the state of the firm.
Therefore, we are able to run two treatments of this game. In the “high-information treatment”, the
first union transfers cooperatively all his information set, including his belief and claim, to the
second union. In the “low-information treatment”, the second union is only informed on the
outcome of the first negotiation. This can figure out the situation in which both unions belong to the
same organization and the one in which they belong to different national unions. This design allows
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to test for the impact of learning on strike incidence and wage settlements, but also of the extent of
information, i.e. the union organization, on bargaining outcomes.
Our results show that unions’ claims follow Myerson (1984)’s revelation principle. Wage
settlements are lower in the second firm since most unions revise their demand downward after a
strike in the first firm. Dunlop’s hypothesis of inflationary wage claim does not hold in most cases.
However, it does not mean that emotions do not play. As predicted by Kuhn and Gu, in the
presence of information spillovers, strike incidence is lower in following negotiations because, in
learning from strike, unions decrease their claims. However, when information is restricted to the
preceding negotiation outcome, it does not reduce significantly its incidence. Thus, the predictions
of Kuhn and Gu are partially refuted. Employers’ bargaining behavior, through their preference for
equitable shares, remains a decisive component of the strike incidence and bargaining outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sums up Kuhn and Gu’s model and
presents our strike model and its predictions. Section 3 introduces the experimental design.
Section 4 analyze experimental data. Section 5 concludes.
II. The Model
Consider the main hypotheses and predictions of Kuhn and Gu before a presentation of our strike
game and its theoretical predictions.
A. Kuhn and Gu (1999)’s Model
Two union-firm pairs bargain sequentially over wages with asymmetric information.1 The nature
determines whether the profit gross of labor costs is GP , if the firm is in a good state, or BP , if the
firm is in a bad state, with 0>P>P BG . Only the firm is perfectly informed on her state. The union
                                                                
1 Kuhn and Gu considers a one-shot take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game and then an infinite-horizon bargaining
model with offers and counter-offers. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only the first model.
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only knows the prior probability, p, that the firm is in a good state. The union makes a demand
[ )¥Î ,0d . If the firm rejects, i.e. a strike occurs, payoffs are null for both since their outside option
is normalized to zero. If the firm accepts, the union obtains what he claimed for. The states of the
two firms are correlated. [ ]1,0Îa  denotes the common knowledge coefficient of correlation
between them. The conditional probabilities that the second firm is in a good state depending on the
state of the first firm are:2
pGGprob )1()/( 12 aa -+=  if firm 1 is in the good state and
pBGprob )1()/( 12 a-=  if firm 1 is in the bad state.
Both unions have the same ex ante value of p ( p p p1 2= = ). The second union is informed on the
outcome of bargaining in the first firm, before posting his claim. Table 1 illustrates strategies and
payoffs.
Let us consider first union 1 (“the leader”). If p>b (with b= BP / GP ), he should ask GP  for
himself. This demand will be accepted by a firm in a good state since in rejecting the firm would
incur the cost of a strike. The demand is rejected by a firm in a bad state. Probability of a strike is
(1-p). If p<b, the union should make a low demand, BP , which is always accepted. Probability of
a strike is zero.
Let us consider now union 2 (“the follower”). His strategy may be influenced by the outcome of the
preceding negotiation which may enable him to adapt his belief. If the first union made a low
demand (p<b), the second union is unable to learn anything from the preceding negotiation since
this demand is accepted by both types of firm. His ex ante belief on firm 2 is unaffected and he
                                                                
2 The joint probabilities of good and bad states at firms 1 and 2 are given in the following table:
Firm 2’s state
Firms 1’s state Good Bad
Good
Bad
2)1( pp aa -+
( )pp -- 1)1( a
p
( )pp -- 1)1( a
( ) ( )21)1(1 pp --+- aa
(1-p)
p
(1-p)
1
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adopts the same behavior as the leader. No strike can occur. The follower may learn on the state of
firm 1 only if union 1 has made a separating (high) demand. In this case, the firm is forced to reveal
his state: a rejection means a bad state whereas an acceptance indicates a good state.
In the case that union 1 made a separating demand rejected by the firm, the occurrence of a strike
in firm 1 leads union 2 to revise his ex ante belief. Union 2’s updated prior that firm 2 is in a good
state is ppr )1( a-= . He makes a separating demand in claiming for GP  only if bpr > , therefore if
)1( a-
> bp . His demand is accepted provided that firm 2 is in a good state. The threshold above
which union 2 separates is thus higher than that of union 1. Claiming for a high wage although a
strike occurred in the first firm means that union 2 is very optimistic. In the case that union 1 made a
separating demand leading to a wage settlement, union 2 learns that firm 1 was in the good state.
Thus, he updates his belief that firm 2 is in the good state: pp r )1( aa -+= . He separates in
claiming for GP  only if bpr > , therefore if )1(
)(
a
a
-
-> bp . His demand is accepted provided that firm
2 is in the good state.
Whenever ( )a-<< 1bpb , union 2 exploits the information obtained from the preceding
negotiation. He asks GP  when the leader separated and no strike ensued and he asks BP  when
the leader separated but a strike occurred.
When union 2 learns from the preceding negotiation (column 2), learning reduces strike incidence
( ( ) ( ) ( )ppp -<-- 111 a  ), increases union 2’s utility compared to union 1 who has no information
( [ ] ( ) BG ppp P-+P-+ 1)1( aa  > GpP ), and firm 2’s expected profit ( )()1)(1( BGpp P-P-- a  > 0).
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Table 1
Bargaining Strategies in Kuhn and Gu’s One-Shot Bargaining Game
Priors bp < )1( a-<<
bpb pb <- )1( a
A. CLAIMS AND ACCEPTANCE DECISIONS
A1. Union-Firm pair 1
Union’s claim BP GP GP
Firm in a good state Acceptation Acceptation Acceptation
Firm in a bad state Acceptation Rejection Rejection
A2. Union-Firm pair 2
Learning by Union 2 on
Firm 1 state Impossible Possible Possible
Union’s claim BP
BP  if strike in firm 1
GP  if wage settlement in Firm 1
GP
Firm in a good state Acceptation Acceptation Acceptation
Firm in a bad state Acceptation Acceptation of BP
Rejection of GP
Rejection
B. BARGAINING OUTCOMES
B1. Union-Firm pair 1
Strike probability 0 )1( p- )1( p-
Expected wage
(conditional on a
settlement occurring)
BP GP GP
Expected profit )( BGp P-P 0 0
Expected utility of the
union B
P GpP GpP
B2. Union-Firm pair 2
Strike probability 0 )1()1( pp --a )1( p-
Expected wage
(conditional on a
settlement occurring)
BP
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]ppp
ppp BG
-+-+
P-+P-+
1)1(
1)1(
2
2
aa
aa
GP
Expected profit )( BGp P-P )()1)(1( BGpp P-P-- a 0
Expected utility of the
union B
P [ ] ( ) BG ppp P-+P-+ 1)1( aa GpP
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However, a strike ensuing in the first firm has an ambiguous impact on striking activity in the
second firm. On the one hand, on average, a strike tends to moderate wage claims and pushes
settled wages downward. This moderation decreases the probability of a strike. On the other
hand, a strike in the first firm makes the bad state more likely in the second firm, favoring the
occurrence of a strike. Anyway, information on the previous negotiations does not motivate unions
to inflate their wage demands compared to the union who negotiated first, but instead the
reduction of information asymmetry allows them to adjust their strategy accordingly. Thus, Kuhn
and Gu asserts that information spillovers are Pareto-improving rather than generating pathological
processes, as forwarded by Dunlop.
B. The Strike Game
Our strike game is largely inspired by the one-shot bargaining model of Kuhn and Gu. However, it
differs from it inasmuch as even though each union gets the same information on the distribution of
probability, we allow for a differentiation of unions’ beliefs. This relaxes an important restriction of
the benchmark model which imposes their similarity, and allows us to study the extent of
information spillovers and its impact.
Our game is designed as a double Ultimatum Bargaining Game with uncertainty on the proposer’s
side, involving two union-firm pairs which bargain in sequence. The choice of an UBG structure is
motivated by the fact that it allows for a realistic representation of union-firm negotiation. In our
game, union’s strength derives from his being the first mover, but this strength is tempered by his
being the weak informed party. In addition, many experiments on UBG have stated robust results,
providing us with an empirical benchmark which our results can be confronted with. These works
have notably identified the extent to which emotions play in this bargaining setting. Thus, it could
help to disentangle learning and emotions in our bargaining setting.
Most research on bargaining with one-sided private information has put uncertainty on the
responder: the proposer knows the realized pie size but the responder is not informed about the
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initial chance move.3 To our knowledge, only few exceptions can be forwarded which put
uncertainty on the proposer’s side and offer a better representation of union-firm bargaining
process. Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) shows that the rejection rate in UBG is higher when the
responder is given the lower payoff and lower when he gets the higher payoff, compared to full
information on both sides. Forsythe, Kennan and Sopher (1991a)4 considers a two-person pie-
splitting game in a cooperative setting. It tests Myerson (1984)’s revelation principle stating that
strike is a means for the union to devise incentive mechanism such as to make the firm reveal her
type. From an experiment where subjects exchange messages, it shows that the theory does not
withstand the facts since some strikes occur even though the good state prevails and the strike
condition does not hold. However, strikes are more frequent whenever the bad state prevails and
the strike condition holds.
Our ultimatum demand game also accounts for this revelation mechanism but in a non cooperative
setting, in controlling for the unions’ beliefs. Two treatments of this game have been run which
differ in the extent of information spillover between the negotiating pairs. Whereas Kuhn and Gu
assumes that the knowledge by each union of the first bargaining outcome is sufficient for a
complete diffusion of information, our model introduces more conditions, i.e. the transfer of
information on the first union’s belief and claim.
The first treatment (“high-information” treatment, see instructions in Appendix A) involves two
union-firm pairs bargaining in sequence, with both unions belonging to the same union organization
and both firms to the same industry. Each union-firm pair bargains about the share of a pie. Each
                                                                
3 Two categories of experiments are available (Croson (1996). On the one hand, some experiments control
responders’ beliefs over the pie size (Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Güth, Huck and Ockenfels, 1996), or observe
the consequences of changes in the prior distribution in demand games (Rapoport, Sundali and Seale, 1996) or
in offer games (Rapoport and Sundali, 1996). On the other hand, other experiments do not control for
responder’s priors (Straub and Murnighan, 1996; Croson, 1996; Güth and van Damme, 1998).
4 Forsythe, Kennan and Sopher (1991b) proposes an experimental study of strikes in which the pie size
declines over time as long as subjects argue about its division, but in complete information. Coursey (1982)
offers a study of strikes when bargaining time is severely limited and information incomplete for both parties
and he points out the role of information limitation.
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pie amounts either to 30 or 100, depending on the business cycle. It is common knowledge that i)
the distribution of probability regarding the state of nature is the same for the two firms and ii) the
two firms are correlated such as the second firm is in the same state as the first one with
probability 0.8.
The game is six-stepped. Consider the first bargaining pair in which the union is the proposer and
the firm is the responder. Nature moves by determining whether the firm is in a good state (the pie
amounts to 100) with probability 0.7 or in a bad state (the pie is 30) with probability 0.3. Then,
negotiation starts up. In step 1, being only informed about the distribution of probability, the union
determines his belief on the pie size (30 or 100) and his wage demand defined in interval [0,100].
In step 2, the firm is informed on the size of the pie. In the case that the demand is higher than the
actual size of the pie, it is automatically rejected; both get nil. Otherwise, the firm decides either to
reject the demand and both get a zero payoff, or to accept it. If an agreement has been reached,
the union gets what he claimed for and the firm gets the difference between the actual pie and the
union’s claim. In step 3, each party is informed about his own payoff.
Consider the second negotiation, that is also designed as an UBG in which the union is the
proposer and the firm is the responder. In step 4, since both belong to the same organization, the
second union is privately informed on the first union’s belief that the first firm is in a good state, his
demand and his payoff. To his turn, he declares his belief (30 or 100) and he makes a demand to
the second firm. In step 5, the second firm is informed on the size of the second pie and she
decides on whether accept or reject the demand. If the demand is greater than the actual size of
the pie, it is automatically rejected and both parties get nothing. Otherwise, the firm can either
reject the demand and then both get zero, or accept the demand. After an agreement has been
reached, the union obtains what he claimed for and the firm gets the difference between the actual
pie and the union’s payoff. In step 6, each party is informed about his own payoff.
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A second treatment (“low-information” treatment, see instructions in Appendix B) has been
designed with the same sequence and rules of bargaining as the high information treatment, except
for one difference. The extent of information transferred to the second union has been reduced.
The f information set only consists of the distribution of probability and the leader’s payoff. Thus,
the follower is only able to draw a belief on the leader’s prior.
The comparison between these treatments aims at varying the institutional framework, since the
low information treatment can figure out multi-unionism, whereas the high information treatment
may correspond to a unique national organization. The major goal of the comparison is to draw
out the impact of higher information spillovers on the probability of a conflict and on the average
wage, conditional on a settlement occurring in the second round of negotiation.
C. Theoretical Predictions
The parameters of the game have received the following values. The firm’s profit gross of labor
costs takes the value GP =100 in a good state and BP =30 in a bad state. The probability
associated with a good state is p=0.7. The degree of correlation between the firms is 8.0=a . The
optimal strategies depend on the relationship between the profit ratio, b, and the union’s belief, p.
b= 3.0
100
30 ==
Õ
Õ
G
B . The inequality [b < p < )1( a-b ] leads to consider the intermediate case
identified in Kuhn and Gu (see Table 1). The optimal strategies are given in Table 2.
The Nash equilibrium of this game is separating since the firm is forced to reveal her type. Since
p>b, the leader should always make a separating demand and ask 100 (or e-100 ) for himself.
Firm 1 should accept this demand if in a good state since it is not worse than her alternative utility
level, normalized to zero. If it turns out that the nature move has determined a bad state, this
demand is automatically rejected and both subjects get 0. The probability for a strike to arise is
0.3. The union's expected payoff is 70 and the expected profit is 0. It should be noted that the first
union should not care about what is happening in the following negotiation since it does affect
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neither his payoffs nor his employer’s. As a matter of fact, this game is not a signaling game.
Observing the settled wage in the first firm, the follower can learn from the preceding negotiation.
Thus, the second union should condition his demand on the outcome he observes. Whenever no
strike occurred and the settled wage is high in the first firm, he should infer the good state of firm 2
and claim for a high wage of 100. In contrast, observing a strike in the first firm should cause the
follower to revise his ex ante belief downward and moderate his demand. Learning from strike
pushes unions’ claims downward and reduces the strike likelihood in the second firm. It also
allows for a Pareto-improvement of both union’s and firm’s utility.
Table 2
Optimal Bargaining Strategies in the Strike Game
Union-Firm pair 1 Union-Firm pair 2
A. Claims and acceptance decisions
Union’s claim 100
30 if strike in Firm 1
100 otherwise
Firm in the good state Acceptation Acceptation
Firm in the bad state Rejection
Acceptation of 30
Rejection of 100
B. Bargaining outcomes
Strike probability 0.3 0.042
Expected wage (conditional on a settlement occurring) 100 78.079
Expected profit 0 2.94
Expected Utility of the Union 70 74.8
These theoretical predictions are similar in both treatments. The common knowledge probability to
face a good state, the correlation coefficient between the two firms and the information conveyed
through the bargaining outcome constitute sufficient conditions for the subjects to behave
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according to these predictions. In equilibrium, there should be no difference in bargaining behavior
or strike incidence across treatments.
These predictions state optimal strategies for selfish agents. Experiments on Ultimatum Bargaining
Games have however revealed the systematic occurrence of more equal shares then theory
predicts. A majority of proposers offer a fair share and unfair offers are frequently rejected by
responders. Here, introducing fairness motivations would lead the first union expecting a good
state of the firm to claim for 50 to 70 instead of 100, and the second union to claim for 15 to 20
instead of 30 whenever a strike occurred in the first firm. Anyway, the leader’s demand remains
separating since it cannot be accepted by a firm who is in the bad state.
Considering non selfish agents however changes learning opportunities. When the leader transfers
his full information set, the follower becomes able to discriminate between three elements leading
to a strike: the leader’s behavior, the employer’s decision and the state of the firm. He is able to
establish a distinction between intentional and unintentional rejection of a claim by the first
employer. He looses this discrimination capacity in the low information treatment. When the
leader’s payoff is 0, he is unable to disentangle between a wrong belief regarding the state of the
firm and the exercise of her veto power by the firm, induced itself either by the union’s greediness
or by the employer’s toughness. We thus state the hypothesis that, with agents motivated by
fairness concerns, conflicts are more likely to occur when information spreads less. If the risk of
conflict is denoted ri, with { }2,1Îi , we should observe the following inequality 122 rrr LowHigh << .
III. Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of 6 sessions and each session consisted of 20 periods. These sessions
were conducted at GATE, University Lumière Lyon 2, France. 68 subjects were recruited from
undergraduate courses in the Engineering Textile School. All of them were inexperienced in
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bargaining experiments. No subject participated in more than one session. The computer program
separated the subjects into groups of size four. A total of 17 groups were formed. 9 groups
played the high information treatment, 8 groups played the low information treatment. A partner
matching protocol was in effect, in which group assignment remained constant throughout the
session. This enables to get more independent observations than a stranger protocol. Moreover,
panel data analysis allows for a control of possible time effects in the behavior of the fixed groups.
All interactions were anonymous and the subjects were never informed about the identity of the
participants they were matched with in a session. The experiment was computerized using ZTree
software developed at Zurich University. On average, a session lasted one hour, excluding
payment of subjects. All amounts were given in ECUs (Experimental Currency Units), with each
ECU convertible to French Francs at 10 ECU=1FF at the end of the session.
Participants were randomly assigned to a specific computer terminal, depending on the number
drawn randomly from a box upon entering the room. Before the experiment begins, written
instructions were distributed to participants and read aloud by the experimenter. All participants
were thus completely informed about the rules and parameters of the game. Questions were
answered privately by the experimenter. Once the experiment began, no communication was
allowed. Each subject then discovered on his computer screen the role he was assigned to. Role
assignment remained constant for the entire session.
The size of the pies was randomly drawn before the experimental sessions and we used the same
series of values for all the sessions in order to make comparisons across groups feasible. At the
beginning of each period, the first union (subject A1 in this decontextualized experiment) had to
declare his belief about the size of the pie and his demand. The first firm (subject B1) was then
informed of the actual size of the pie and of the union’s demand. He could then decide whether to
accept or reject. Each was then informed on his respective payoff. Then, the second union-firm
pair started to bargain. The second union (subject A2) was informed of the A1’s payoff, and
additionally of A1’s belief and demand in the high information treatment. A2 could then decide on
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his own belief and demand. The second firm (subject B2) was informed of the size of the pie, but
not on the outcome of the preceding negotiation since we were not interested in studying the
effects of information spillovers on employers’ behavior. Then he decided to accept or reject the
demand. After a feedback on each party’s payoffs, the round was over and the computer
continued to the next period. At the end of each period, once all participants have completed their
decisions, each could see an historic table displaying a summary of his decisions, the other
player’s reactions and his payoff, in all preceding periods.
At the end of the session, participants were requested to fulfill a post-experiment questionnaire.
Then, their payoffs were converted from ECUs to French Francs and they were asked to move
one by one to a separate room in order to get paid confidentially. There, they were given an
envelop including their payment in cash. Payment consisted of the sum of payoffs in each period
increased by an amount of 20 FF as a show-up fee.
IV. Experimental Results
This section presents a discussion of the overall statistics, before focusing on a panel data analysis
of the role of information on, successively, unions’ bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes in
the second round of negotiation.
A. General Results
Many differences arise from a comparison between the first and the second negotiations, as
indicated in Table 3.
Consider the high information treatment. As predicted, whereas a large majority of unions who
bargain first believe that the firm is in a good state, the second unions adjust their beliefs in taking
into account the outcome of the first negotiation. A 2c  test shows that the structure of beliefs
significantly differs from one negotiation to the following at a 0% level. However, almost half of the
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second unions still believe that their firm is in a good state even though the first bargaining ended
up by a conflict, attributing the responsibility of the strike to the employers’ toughness.
Table 3
Summary Statistics
High Information Low Information
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
A. Belief and claims
Rate of beliefs that pie=100 0.97 0.77 0.89 0.80
Rate of beliefs that pie=30 0.03
0.51 if strike in
firm 1
0.05 otherwise
0.11
0.35 if strike in
firm 1
0.09 otherwise
Average claim 54.58
51.36 [36.84 if
strike in firm 1
60.18 otherwise)
54.63
48.73 [44.42 if
strike in firm 1
52.01otherwise]
B. Bargaining Outcomes
Rate of agreement in firms in
the good state
0.85 (108/126) 0.88 (111/126) 0.78 (87/112) 0.80 (90/112)
Rate of agreement in firms in
the bad state
0.07 (4/54) 0.30 (16/54) 0.08 (4/48) 0.19 (9/48)
Global strike rate
0.38 (68/180)
in which 0.28
(19/68) non
automatic
0.29 (53/180) in
which 0.45
(24/53) non
automatic
0.43 (69/160)
in which 0.42
(29/69) non
automatic
0.38 (61/160) in
which 0.39
(24/61) non
automatic
Average wage (conditional on
a settlement occurring)
51.30 48.82 50.52 43.66
Average profit (conditional on
a settlement occurring)
46.19 42.35 46.39 49.96
Average wage (unconditional) 31.92 34.45 28.73 27.01
Average Profit (unconditional) 28.74 29.88 26.38 30.91
Accordingly, followers’ average wage claims are scaled down after a strike occurred in the first
negotiation, and adjusted upward after an agreement was reached (this is the only case fitting with
Dunlop’s assertion). The differences in claims are significant at a 12% level according to a
Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test. It should be noted that in both firms most unions make separating
demands but they also exhibit a concern for fairness since they could make higher demands
consistent with their beliefs. This reflects usual behavior in experiments on ultimatum bargaining
game.
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As predicted, most demands are accepted whenever the firms are in a good state and rejected
otherwise. The overall rate of strike declines from 0.38 in the first bargaining set (close to the
theoretical prediction of 0.3) to 0.28 in the second one. The adjustment of the second unions’
claims allows to reach a higher rate of agreement in both types of firms, but especially in bad state
firms where this rate reaches 0.3 against 0.07 in the first bargaining.
Even though decreasing, the rate of strike in the second negotiation remains however greater than
predicted theoretically (0.04). This can be explained by opposing “automatic” and “non
automatic” rejections. Automatic rejections occur whenever the union’s demand is higher than the
realized pie size, the only case accounted for by the theoretical model with selfish agents. Non
automatic rejections are due to an intentional decision of the employer to reject acceptable
demands. In our experiment, on the one hand, the claim moderation observed after a conflict is
not sufficient to avoid automatic rejections in the second firm: despite their decrease in comparison
with the first negotiation, they still generate 55% of the strikes. On the other hand, in the remaining
45%, equity considerations induce the firm to reject intentionally demands that are considered as
being unfair. This also reflects usual behavior in UBG experiments.
As predicted, experimental evidence indicates both a decrease in the average wages whenever a
settlement occurred and an overall increase of union’s and employer’s payoffs in the second
negotiation. This results from both claim moderation and a sharp drop in the incidence of conflicts.
Consider now the low information treatment. The same tendencies are observed than in the high
information treatment. In the second firms, unions revise their beliefs and claims downward after
being informed on a strike occurring in the preceding negotiation. A 2c  test shows that the
distribution of beliefs is different between the first and the second negotiations, but similar to the
high information treatment in the second firm, at a 4% level. A Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test
accepts the null hypothesis of similar demand distributions in the first negotiation in both treatments
at a 6% level. The same test rejects the null hypothesis of a similarity between the average claims
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made in the first and second negotiation at a 5% level. A Wilcoxon Mann Whitney test also
rejects the hypothesis of different demand distributions in the second firms across treatments, at a
41% level. But this is no longer true if one considers the evolution of behavior over time.
However, a change point test, significant at a 2% level, reveals that, from the middle of the game
on, high informed unions increase their average demand (which amounts in average to 70% of the
supposed pie size) after an agreement has been settled in the first firm. In contrast, in the low
information treatment, such an evolution does not occur and unions continue to demand on
average 60% of the expected pie size.
Regarding the fist negotiation, a 2c  test allows to conclude that there is no difference in the strike
rates nor in the average payoffs between the two treatments, at a 1% level. As a consequence of
the revision of beliefs and claims, like when high information spillovers are allowed, the rate of
agreement in the second negotiation increases whatever the situation of the firm. However, the rate
of strike remains significantly higher, at a 11% level, than when unions receive more information,
as shown by a 2c  test. As predicted in considering fairness concerns, 122 rrr LowHigh << . Like in the
high information treatment, a large proportion of strikes (39%) are due to intentional rejections of
acceptable demands. However, whereas more information allows a decline in the share of
automatic rejections in the overall strikes in the second negotiation, the share of non intentional
rejections is stable when unions are less informed. Lastly, when an agreement has been reached,
the average settled wage is lower in the second firm, like when unions are more informed. But, in
contrast with the high information treatment, there is no significant difference in the average wage
unconditional on a settlement among the first and second firms, as concluded by a Wilcoxon Mann
Whitney test which rejects similarity at a 22% level. This is due to the incidence of strikes which
remains higher when unions receive less information.
To sum up, experimental evidence from both treatments rejects the hypothesis of an inflationary
wage claim emphasized by Dunlop, since unions revise their claims downward after having
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observed a strike occurring in the preceding negotiation. The average wage claim only increases
after an agreement has been reached when unions are given more opportunity to learn. As in Kuhn
and Gu (1999), learning from strike can allow to reduce conflict incidence and makes each party
better off in most cases. Does this mean that behavior is entirely determined by learning?
Information spillovers seem insufficient for achieving the predicted claim revision and emotions
also play since employers do reject acceptable demands. While the extent of information favors
the settlement of agreements by helping unions to revise their claims, it also induce a tougher
behavior from the employers who intentionally reject more demands, which explains that average
wages are considerably lower than predicted.
For a better understanding of the role of information and learning in bargaining behavior, a strict
test of the structural model is performed, through panel data analysis. No control variables are
added since the aim is to identify the pure effect of information variables. We perform OLS
estimations on unions’ demands and payoffs and probit regressions on unions’ beliefs and strike
incidence in the second negotiation. For each estimation, individual and time dimensions are taken
into account, controlling for both possible heterogeneity. The results obtained with pooling data
are tested against models with effects (LM test). Whenever the models with effects fit better the
data, the OLS fixed effect model is tested against the random effect model (Hausman test).
Similarly, the simple binomial probit models are tested against the random group and time effect
models. Only the results of the best fitting models are presented below. The results on union
behavior (beliefs and claims) are examined before those on bargaining outcomes.
B. Information, Unions’ Beliefs and Claims
Unions’ behavior in the second round of negotiation gives information a different weight according
to its extent (see Table 4). When less informed, unions pay attention to the average unions’ payoff
in the first negotiation in revising their belief upward, as predicted by Kuhn and Gu, and their claim
downward. This means that they learn from the preceding negotiation: the greater the first unions’
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payoff, the more likely the good state of the second firm, but also the higher the risk of intentional
rejection by their employer if the demand is considered as feasible but unfair. The occurrence of a
strike also lowers claims significantly. Information favors cautious behavior under low information
condition.
Table 4
Determinants of Unions’ Beliefs (Binomial Probit Model) and Claims (Least Squares
with Individual Dummy Variables and Time Effects)
High Information Low Information
Beliefs (pie=100) Claims Beliefs (pie=100) Claims
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant
-1.3547
(0.8187)
0.0980 0.2407
(2.0027)
0.9045 0.1816
(0.5759)
0.7525 2.5634
(1.5196)
0.0936
Union's belief in the
first negotiation
0.1464
(0.9688)
0.8799 8.5153
(2.6566)
0.0016 … … … …
Union's claim in the
first negotiation
0.0187
(0.0146)
0.2010 -0.0752
(0.05166)
0.1470
… … … …
Union’s payoff in
the first negotiation
0.0445
(0.0331)
0.1788 -0.0982
(0.0688)
0.1552 0.0252
(0.0123)
0.0397 -0.0839
(0.0293)
0.0048
Strike in the first
negotiation
0.0506
(1.6791)
0.9760 -7.0133
(4.0588)
0.0858 0.2096
(0.5965)
0.7253 -6.8904
(1.6555)
0.0001
Pseudo R2 
2c
Adjusted R-squared
0.3660
69.72486
…
…
…
0.9997
0.1324
21.1987
…
…
…
0.9997
Note.- Standard errors are reported in parentheses . In the high information treatment (the low information
treatment, respectively), the number of observations is 180 (160). In the Probit estimation, the value of the log-
likelihood –61.7215 (–69.46502) and the value of the restricted log-likelihood is  –96.5839 (–80.0644). The
significance level of the 2c  is 0.0000 (0.0002) and the percentage of good predictions is 0.83 (0.8). In the OLS
estimations, the value of the log-likelihood is –475.2172 (-424.5319) and the value of the restricted log-
likelihood is  –1233.4833 (–1096.1833).
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When unions are more informed, their claims are influenced positively by information on leaders’
beliefs and negatively by information on the occurrence of a strike. Their behavior is not highly
significantly influenced by the other unions’ claims and wage, which challenges Dunlop’s
conjecture. Surprisingly, their beliefs are not determined by information spillovers. This contrasts
with unions’ behavior when they are given low information. This means that the determinants of
unions’ behavior cannot be restrained to information and learning.
C. Information, Strike Incidence and Payoffs
When information spillovers are large, a subset of information about the first bargaining influences
the strike incidence (Table 5) and unions’ payoffs (Table 6) in the second negotiation. This
influence vanishes when information spillover is limited.
Table 5
Determinants of the Strike Incidence (Binomial Probit Model)
High Information Low Information
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant 1.0480
(0.6623)
0.1136 0.0177
(0.4579)
0.9692
Union's belief in the first negotiation -0.2996
(0.7658)
0.6957 … …
Union's claim in the first negotiation 0.0067
(0.0144)
0.6416 … …
Union’s payoff  in the first negotiation -0.0347
(0.0228)
0.1271 -0.0073
(0.0087)
0.3992
Strike in the first negotiation -1.5293
(1.2799)
0.2321 -0.2561
(0.4826)
0.5957
Pseudo R2 0.4224 0.0048
2c 9.2656 1.0256
Note.- Standard errors are reported in parentheses . In the high information treatment, the number of
observations is 180. The value of the log-likelihood is –104.4622 and the value of the restricted log-likelihood is
–109.0950. The significance level of the 2c is 0.0548 and the percentage of good predictions 0.72. In the low
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information treatment, the number of observations is 160. The value of the log-likelihood is –105.8348 and the
value of the restricted log-likelihood is  -106.3476. The significance level of the 2c is 0.5988 and the percentage
of good predictions 0.62.
Summary results indicated that extended information among unions was associated to a decrease
of the strike incidence due to automatic rejections. From the Probit estimation, only the first
union’s payoff could be taken into account. The lower this payoff, the less the strike incidence in
the second negotiation, since a low payoff induces a downward revision of claims. But when
unions are less informed, the knowledge of the outcome of the preceding negotiation does not
significantly affect strikes, in contrast with Kuhn and Gu. While information variables are not
directly relevant, the employers’ reluctance against unequal shares is probably more influential a
determinant of the strike incidence.
Table 6
Determinants of Unions’ Payoffs (Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables and Time
Effects)
High Information Low Information
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Constant 12.9805
(9.5612)
0.1763 20.3137
(7.8879)
0.0109
Union's belief in the first negotiation -2.4132
(12.6834)
0.8493
… …
Union's claim in the first negotiation -0.1888
(0.2467)
0.4449
… …
Union’s payoff in the first negotiation 0.7252
(0.3286)
0.0286 0.1458
(0.1523)
0.3399
Strike in the first negotiation 29.0160
(19.3771)
0.1361 5.8308
(8.5938)
0.4985
Adjusted R2 0.5872 0.5052
Note.- Standard errors are reported in parentheses . In the high information treatment, the number of
observations is 180. The value of the log-likelihood is –756.5952. The value of the restricted log-likelihood is –
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854.5558. In the low information treatment, the number of observations is 160. The value of the log-likelihood is
–688.0387 and the value of the restricted log-likelihood is  -744.9514.
Similarly, under extended information, the second unions’ payoffs are positively affected by the
first ones’ and, to some extent, by the occurrence of a strike in the first negotiation since it
conveys a signal on the necessity to revise claims. In contrast, the same variables, when they
constitute the whole information set, exert no significant influence.
Thus, in contrast with the theoretical predictions of our strike model with selfish agents, bargaining
outcomes differ in the extent of the information set. Kuhn and Gu’s predictions on the Pareto-
improving effect of information spillovers do not stand when unions only receive information on the
preceding negotiation outcome. This information is influential only when embedded in a larger set
of information, even though the other pieces of information do not influence directly the outcomes
but mainly help the second unions in better understanding the first bargaining outcome and thus
revising their own claims. Once again, employers’ behavior is possibly a better direct candidate in
explaining bargaining outcomes.
V. Conclusion
It is now widely acknowledged that asymmetric information in bargaining pairs conveys an
important source of conflict in wage negotiation. Consequently, whenever the uninformed party in
the negotiation can improve his knowledge, it should be better off since the risk of conflicts should
diminish. Information on the business climate, and thus on the capacity of the firm to pay, can be
provided by the observation of preceding negotiations in other companies. Kuhn and Gu (1999)
provides such a model in which two union-firm pairs bargain in sequence over the share of a pie,
each firm being correlated with the other. We have proposed herein a model which replicates the
same structure but differs from that of Kuhn and Gu as regards, first, a dissociation between the
unions’ beliefs and the distribution probability about the state of the firm and, second, the extent of
the information set transferred from the first to the second union. Whereas the “low information”
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treatment replicates Kuhn and Gu’s, the “high information” treatment endows the second union
with an additional information about the first union’s behavior.
Experimental evidence confirms Kuhn and Gu and our model’s predictions that information
spillovers and learning are a driving force of claim revision in bargaining, i.e. unions decrease their
demand when learning from a conflict occurring in the preceding negotiation. This casts some
doubt on Dunlop’s conjecture that observing preceding negotiation outcomes lead unions to revise
pathologically their claims upward, entailing an inflationary wage process. An upward revision of
claims is observed only when unions are able to learn from the first unions’ behavior and not only
from the bargaining outcome.
However, learning is insufficient for achieving the predicted claim revision and, therefore, the
predicted wage. Informational conditions have to be distinguished. Whenever unions can only
learn from the first bargaining outcome, information spillovers do not significantly influence strike
incidence and bargaining outcomes, thus refuting Kuhn and Gu’s predictions. In contrast,
whenever they are given more complete information enabling to learn from the leading unions’
bargaining behavior, information spillovers lower strike incidence and Pareto-improve bargaining
outcomes.
Three conclusions can be drawn from this asymmetric information experimental game. First, in the
presence of fairness concerns, the opportunity to observe the bargaining outcome but not the
bargaining process cannot enable a reduction in informational asymmetry sufficient to guarantee
Pareto improving bargaining outcomes. Second, if one extrapolates informational structure to
institutional organization, union heterogeneity challenges the potential benefits related to
information spillovers, whereas union unity helps to a more profitable behavior for both parties.
Third, if the pathological behavior predicted by Dunlop is not encountered in experimental data,
this does not mean that emotions are absent. On the contrary, employers do reject acceptable
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offers. This clearly points out to the necessity to consider more actively not only asymmetric
uncertainty but also both parties bargaining behavior.
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